Discussion Questions: There are multiple threats vectors to the world’s maritime transportation system (MTS) and their associated ports from small boat attacks to the possibility of CBRNE attacks.  For this forum, consider what these threat vectors are, what challenges are present in detecting these concerns and what security/industry at all levels are doing to address them. You response should be holistic and consider this issue from the strategic, operational and tactical level. Consider the impact and importance of the development of Mega Ports, the widening of the Panama Canal, and the increased use of the western rivers of the United States as a means of moving large quantities of hazardous chemicals.  It is imperative that you consider both man-made and natural threats to the MTS. 

Instructions: Fully utilize the materials that have been provided to you in order to support your response. Your initial post should be at least 500 words. Please respond to at least two other students. Responses should be a minimum of 250 words and include direct questions. You may challenge, support or supplement another student’s answer using the terms, concepts and theories from the required readings. Also, do not be afraid to respectfully disagree where you feel appropriate; as this should be part of your analysis process at this academic level.

CREATE Research Archive

Non-published Research Reports


A Brief Analysis of Threats and Vulnerabilities in the Maritime Domain Niyazi Onur Bakir CREATE, nbakir@usc.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://research.create.usc.edu/nonpublished_reports

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CREATE Research Archive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Non-published Research Reports by an authorized administrator of CREATE Research Archive. For more information, please contact gribben@usc.edu.

Recommended Citation Bakir, Niyazi Onur, “A Brief Analysis of Threats and Vulnerabilities in the Maritime Domain” (2007). Non-published Research Reports. Paper 5. http://research.create.usc.edu/nonpublished_reports/5http://research.create.usc.edu?utm_source=research.create.usc.edu%2Fnonpublished_reports%2F5&utm_medium=PDF&utm_campaign=PDFCoverPageshttp://research.create.usc.edu/nonpublished_reports?utm_source=research.create.usc.edu%2Fnonpublished_reports%2F5&utm_medium=PDF&utm_campaign=PDFCoverPageshttp://research.create.usc.edu/nonpublished_reports?utm_source=research.create.usc.edu%2Fnonpublished_reports%2F5&utm_medium=PDF&utm_campaign=PDFCoverPageshttp://research.create.usc.edu/nonpublished_reports/5?utm_source=research.create.usc.edu%2Fnonpublished_reports%2F5&utm_medium=PDF&utm_campaign=PDFCoverPagesmailto:gribben@usc.edu

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N.O. BAKIR University of Southern California, Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (CREATE) 3710 McClintock Avenue, RTH 322, Los Angeles, CA 90089-2902 USA


The attacks of September 11 have exposed the vulnerability of the American homeland

against terrorism. Terrorists have already expressed their intentions to continue their

aggression towards United States. Their goal is to incur maximum economic damage,

inflict mass casualty, spread unprecedented fear among citizens and thus destabilize the

nation to further their agenda. Many critical sites lay across US maritime borders, all of

which could be potential targets to accomplish these goals. All these sites are simple

elements of a complex body where the vulnerability of the whole system is a function

of the vulnerability of the weakest element against an adaptive adversary. Ports, nuclear

facilities, LNG facilities, urban areas, bridges, chemical plants and other critical

infrastructure are all elements of this complex system. In this paper, we review the

current status of security in the American maritime realm and discuss the programs and

initiatives that seek to minimize terrorism risk. Our goal is to direct attention to various

possible avenues that could be used to illegally introduce weapons, explosives and

other contraband as well as to penetrate terrorists into the American homeland.

1 Disclaimer: This research was supported by the United States Department of

Homeland Security through the Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism

Events (CREATE) under grant number N00014-05-0630. However, any opinions,

findings, and conclusions or recommendations in this document are those of the

authors and do not necessarily reflect views of the United States Department of

Homeland Security.

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1. Introduction

United States (hereafter US) sea borders include 95,000 miles of coastline and 3.4

million square miles 2 of exclusive economic zone. Huge economic value of trade,

number of jobs provided, and a multitude of stakeholders involved render security

along coasts and waterways critical for the American homeland. Port security is the

underpinning of the US economy and a terrorist attack may deliver a serious blow to

supply-chain operations and continuity of business. Besides, terrorists have already

expressed their intentions to target economic lifeline of the US, which raise concerns

that an attack in the maritime domain may be in the making. Despite the efforts after

September 11 (hereafter 9/11) to improve security, US waterways and critical

infrastructure along the borders remain vulnerable to a terrorist attack.

Maritime security is closely related to border security, which requires a systems

approach to protect the American homeland from a terrorist infiltration or attack. The

main objective of border security should be to minimize casualties, injuries and

economic losses due to terrorism, while ensuring flow of commerce, continuity of

business, conserving environment, as well as supporting international partnerships for

research, development, and education. As terrorist strategies are dynamic and terrorists

have shown their capability to develop tactics that are adaptive to new environments,

gaps in border security should be addressed following a comprehensive approach

seeking to reduce the risk at all potential points of illegal entry or a terrorist attack. As

such, to reduce the risk of terrorism along the borders, a systems-based risk

management approach that captures the complex relationship between multiple

elements and their exposure to interdependent risks should be implemented. Such an

approach will produce comparative risk assessments that will help deploy necessary

resources to sites facing the greatest risk, and mitigate exposure to a nationally tolerable


US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has adopted a risk based approach to

counter terrorism. In this context, risk is defined as the cross product of threat,

vulnerability and consequence [37]. Threat is defined as the probability of a terrorist

attack. One can extend this definition to specify the time frame, the location, type of

weapon used and the terrorist groups involved in the attack. Nevertheless, this is the

component of risk that the US administration has relatively less control. Vulnerability is

the probability of damage given that a terrorist attack occurs. Damage can take any

form stated in the border security objective statement, as well as other consequences for

which a widely accepted measure does not exist. Consequences are simply the expected

2 Department of State website, www.state.govhttp://www.state.gov/

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damage inflicted from a successful terrorist attack. Following this definition of risk, the

goal in this paper is to discuss what constitutes threat in maritime domain and

vulnerabilities that could potentially be exploited by a sophisticated adversary.

Consequence assessments are beyond the scope of this paper.

2. Threats in the Maritime Domain

Terrorism threat from the maritime domain may come in various forms. For example,

weapons or explosives may be concealed in containers, ships may be used as weapons

to destroy critical infrastructure, or terrorists may illegally cross the borders to launch

attacks in the homeland. Terrorists have a wide array of options, which could culminate

into a catastrophic attack. They have already shown their capacity to operate in open

seas successfully for other non-terrorism purposes: piracy, illegal smuggling of

contraband, and illegal human trafficking across the borders. Therefore, they may

utilize the expertise in other forms of maritime crimes that has accumulated over the

years to launch more damaging attacks exploiting vulnerabilities in the global maritime

system. Accordingly, increased capability to respond to each terrorist activity may

prove to be very valuable, and require cooperation between nations.


Although historically not intertwined with terrorism, piracy is reemerging as a serious

threat to impede conduct of global business. In 2003, there were 445 attacks in which

21 crew members were killed, 71 reported missing, and 359 were taken hostage 3 . The

number of attacks dropped to 325 in 2004 with an increase in the death toll from 21 the

previous year to 30. Actual figures may be far more disturbing. Shipping companies

tend to underreport the incidents due to fears of increasing insurance premiums and

lengthy investigations that may result in loss of reputation. As Singapore’s Deputy

Prime Minister, Tony Tan, said, “piracy is entering a new phase; recent attacks have

been conducted with almost military precision. The perpetrators are well-trained, and

have well laid out plans.” [24] Annual cost of lost cargo has risen to $16 billion, mainly

due to piracy, truck hijacking, and theft around the ports.

Pirates have excelled in hijacking ships over the years. Once the ship is hijacked,

“turning it into a phantom ship, erasing its original identity, is relatively easy” [4]. The

ships are then known to be painted at remote docks and given a completely new

identity. A relatively simple way to do this is getting a new registry by changing flags

3 Annuals statistics released by International Maritime Bureau (IMB).

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in “flag-of-convenience” countries 4 . The fleets of these countries are growing.

Registration standards in these countries are relatively lax and there are no requirements

on the nationality of crew members. Most “flag-of-convenience” ships are relatively

unprotected against piracy. In 2003, 63% of all losses in absolute tonnage were

accounted for by just 13 FOC registers. 5 These characteristics of flag-of-convenience

ships render them and their cargo high risk.

There is minimal law enforcement in international waters that pirates are known to be

operating. Most piracy incidents take place in the Far East, in regions such as

Indonesia, Malacca Straits, Malaysia, Singapore Straits, and South China Sea. Other

geographical locations with reported cases include India, Philippines, Bangladesh, Gulf

of Aden, Colombia, Venezuela, Vietnam, Red Sea, and Dominican Republic. Most of

these countries have minimal resources for maritime patrolling and long coastlines,

granting the freedom of looting to pirates. Corruption among maritime officials also

adds to the complexity of law enforcement in these waters. Modern pirates use

technology for vessel surveillance, automatic weapons, and motorized boats to hijack

ships with valuable cargo. Investment in this technology is easily justified with

potential loots that range from $8 million to $200 million per vessel [21]. This is also a

good financing source for terrorist operations and a catalyst in developing the inter-

connection between piracy and terrorism.

There is minimal cooperation between nations to combat piracy, and each country is

responsible to enforce the law in their territorial waters. Pirates have a good

understanding of their operational environment. They usually elude maritime officials

by crossing national sea boundaries and exploit vulnerabilities due to lack of

information sharing and international cooperation. The Malaysian Maritime

Enforcement Center stated: “Under no circumstances would we intrude into each

other’s territory. If we chase a ship and it runs into the other side, we let the authorities

there handle it.” [35] Therefore, penalizing maritime criminals is quite difficult. It

requires arrest authority unlimited by national boundaries and willingness of authorities

to enforce law in the maritime domain.

4 A “flag-of-convenience” ship is defined as the ship that flies the flag of a country other than the

country of ownership. International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) maintains the list of “flag-of-

convenience” countries.

5 ITF website: www.itfglobal.orghttp://www.itfglobal.org/

Page 5 of 33


Another concern is human and drug smuggling across maritime borders. This is

particularly important because terrorists may use similar pathways to sneak illegal

weapons through the border or to deliver a dirty bomb to seaports. Most of maritime

human smuggling operations into US are launched from Caribbean Waters. However,

in recent years an increasing number of Chinese migrants are caught in container ships

at seaports. For instance, in 1999, 259 Chinese migrants aboard the freighter, Wing

Fung Lung, were intercepted while traveling with no bed or sanitation facilities [31]. In

January, 2005, 32 Chinese nationals were found in two shipping containers at the Port

of Los Angeles [32]. Those traveling in containers are usually discovered to be

traveling under miserable conditions. In 2001, Irish Police found a cargo container with

8 dead and 5 sick immigrants [22]. Similarly, in 2000, British Police discovered 58

Chinese nationals in a truck that traveled to England on a ferry, suffocating at the brink

of death. High risks of death do not seem to deter the aliens from seeking illegal entry

into developed countries for the prospects of economic prosperity.

Terrorists may use illegal human trafficking tactics to cross the American borders

without bearing inhumane conditions as other economic migrants. In 2001, a stowaway

was discovered at the Italian port of Gioia Tauro, traveling from Egypt to Canada [26].

An Egyptian, Rizik Amid Farid, converted a container into a hotel room with a bed,

restroom, enough supplies of food, a laptop computer, two mobile phones, and cameras.

Among his belongings were a Canadian passport and airport security passes, which

aroused the suspicion that he was involved in a terrorist plot to copycat 9/11 attacks.

While this was never confirmed, the incident was a clear indication that terrorists may

enter the US hiding in a container. In 2004, the Israeli port of Ashdod was the location

of a suicide bomb attack by two Palestinians who were able to hide in a container. 6

Like piracy, stowaways are becoming a common phenomenon in the international

maritime domain. In many cases, stowaways board the ship without any recognition

exploiting lax security at seaports, and may actually attempt to hijack the ship. 7 The

crew may not have effective means to confront the problem once a stowaway is found

on the ship. In some cases, stowaways are completely ignored to eliminate the

possibility of an armed confrontation. Most countries refuse to accept stowaways if

they are citizens of another country. Hence, handing stowaways over to port officials

may not be an alternative solution to the problem. The best solution from the

6 The suicide bombers were reportedly members of Al-Aqsa Martyr’s Brigade.

7 One such incident reportedly took place in 2000, when 14 Iranian stowaways hijacked an Italian


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perspective of ship crew seeking to minimize trouble on board could be simply ignoring

the stowaway.

Drug smuggling is also a part of the problem. Smugglers introduce drugs and other

illegal contraband in small boats or in containerized cargo. It is widely believed that the

multi-billion dollar drug trade has historically exploited low inspection rates on

containers at various ports. Detecting such illegal contraband has been likened to

finding a needle in a haystack. In recent years, approximately 75% of cocaine seizures

by the US Coast Guard took place in the Eastern Pacific 8 . While there has not been any

confirmed explosive or weapon smuggling into the US through maritime borders using

containerized cargo or small boats for terrorism purposes, similar tactics can clearly be

used by terrorists in the future. In 2003, ABC News deliberately sent depleted uranium

in a container from Indonesia, and government screeners failed to detect the nuclear

content. More recently, Armen Barseghyan of Armenia was reportedly charged in an

alleged scheme to smuggle grenade launchers, shoulder-fired missiles, and other

Russian military weapons into the US. A more disturbing aspect of the case is its

discovery by an FBI informant who posed as an Al-Qaeda representative.


While terrorists have largely targeted land sites, it has been evident over the course of

recent history that seaborne terrorism poses an unignorable threat. International waters

have long been penetrated by terrorists, and there is virtually no protection for

commercial ships against this growing threat. US vessels are not immune from the rise

of maritime terrorism as shown by the boat attack on naval destroyer, Cole, in 2000. It

is even more disturbing to realize that terrorists having a continuum of options can

sabotage the flow of international trade with relatively less effort than in 9/11. As

terrorists develop their maritime terrorism skills, the probability of launching an attack

with catastrophic consequences on US economic interests will increase. Al-Qaeda has

already stated interest to this end. After the attack on French tanker, Limburg 2002,

Osama Bin Laden released an audio tape in which he stated “By God, the youths of

God are preparing for you things that would fill your hearts with terror and target your

economic lifeline until you stop your oppression and aggression.”

Further intelligence seems to confirm that Al-Qaeda may still be planning attacks on

maritime targets. In 2002, Al-Qaeda’s former chief of naval operations confessed plans

8 United States Coast Guard Fiscal Year 2004 Report.

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to attack ships passing through the Strait of Gibraltar. 9 The scheme was later foiled by

Moroccan officials. The alleged mastermind of the terrorist attacks on 9/11, Khalid

Shaikh Mohammed, was reportedly involved in a plot to export weapons and

explosives into the US [20]. He was reported to make an offer to an import/export firm

to use their containers for shipping illegal contraband to the New York & New Jersey

port. For years, drug dealers have been known to employ a similar tactic of buying out a

trustworthy shipping company to disguise their shipments [10]. Drug smuggling chains

can be discovered after observing patterns of shipments. However, maritime security

officials have no luxury to observe such patterns to counter terrorism threat because one

successful attempt to evade detection seaports may bring catastrophe.

Al Qaeda is believed to control approximately 15 ships which fly Yemen and Somalia

flags. Other terrorist organizations have been active in the maritime domain for almost

half a century. Most seaborne terrorism attacks were carried out by local groups as

rather isolated incidents seeking to gain independence and oppose the regional

governments. However, there were relatively high profile incidents in the past that

exposed the capability of their perpetrators in successfully operating in the maritime

domain and had political ramifications in the global arena. Some of the terrorist

organizations and other militant groups involved in these incidents are as follows:

● Hezbollah: While Hezbollah is less known with its attacks in this domain, they

were active in laying mines in the Red Sea in mid ’80s to impede access to

Israeli ports. In 1984, they organized a mine attack on the southern entrance of

Suez Canal that hit 19 ships.

● Polisario Front: This militant group whose goal was independence of Western

Sahara was quite active in ’70s and ’80s. Their main targets were Spanish and

Portugese vessels operating off the northwestern coast of Africa. They were

known to carry out direct attacks on their targets with mortar and machine-gun


● IRA: IRA targeted cruise liners and cargo ships in ’70s and ’80s and were

involved with illegal transport of weapons and munitions.

● Palestinian Liberation Front: They hijacked the Italian cruise liner, Achille

Lauro, in 1985 off the Egyptian coast and took 511 passengers hostage

demanding release of Palestinian prisoners in Israel. One American passenger

was killed in this assault.

9 “A Time Bomb for Global Trade: Maritime-related Terrorism in an Age of Weapons of Mass Destruction”, Address by Michael Richardson on September 2004 to the Victorian Branch of the Australian

Institute of International Affairs.

Page 8 of 33

● Abu Nidal: This organization was active in late ’80s in hijacking incidents. In

1987, they captured a French yacht off the coast of Gaza Strip to warn Arab

leaders not to entitle late King Hussein of Jordan to be the representative of

Palestinians in peace talks. All hostages were released at the request of


● Chechen Rebels: In 1996, they hijacked a ferry sailing from a northern port of

Turkey (Trabzon), and demanded withdrawal of Russian troops from a

Daghestani village. After a series of negotiations, the hijackers were later


● Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (a.k.a. Tamil Tigers): This terrorist

organization has been quite active in recent years attacking ships off the coast

of Sri Lanka. While their primary target has been Sri Lankan Navy ships, they

were also involved in attacking Chinese and North Korean ships with the

intent of disrupting maritime traffic in the region. They have singled out

themselves from most other terrorist groups engaged in seaborne terrorism by

using suicide tactics.

● Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Currently, this rebel group has discontinued its

terrorist activities following a peace accord with the Indonesian government.

Before the agreement, they were active in Malacca Straits with relatively small

scale attacks.

Besides Al-Qaeda, some other organizations are believed to harbor intentions to launch

seaborne attacks that target United States and its allies. In southeast Asia, where piracy

is rampant, Jemaah Islamiya (JI), Lashkar Jundullah (LJ), and Kampulan Mujahidin

Malaysia (KMM) are among the active terrorist organizations that could potentially

direct their attention to maritime terrorism. Elsewhere, as mentioned in the previous

section, Al-Aqsa Martyr’s Brigade has already shipped two suicide bombers to an

Israeli port disguised in a container. It is expected that terrorism in open seas will

continue be a threat unless radical measures that foster coordination between nations

and intelligence sharing are taken.

3. Vulnerabilities along Maritime Borders and Countermeasures for Risk


The current status of maritime security in the US can be analyzed under two main

categories: port security and security in US waters. The Maritime Transportation

Security Act (MTSA), signed by President Bush on November 25, 2002, was prepared

to address the security of ports and waterways. As a result of this act, maritime security

enforcement responsibility has been mainly assigned to the United States Coast Guard

(USCG), the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the Transportation

Security Administration (TSA) under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as

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well as the Maritime Administration (MARAD) under the Department of

Transportation (DOT). The USCG has the lead responsibility in most MTSA

assignments, as well as the security of US waters and coastal targets, while the CBP

assumes a key role in improving security of inbound cargo at maritime ports.


Seaports are arguably the most critical nodes in the global supply-chain and hence have

a central role in business continuity. They make a huge contribution to the US

economy by facilitating trade and tourism, providing jobs, and supplementing the

energy need. 95% of overseas trade by weight and 75% by value moves through US

seaports. Many critical coastal targets, including petroleum tank farms, hazardous

material storage facilities and factories are located around the ports. Besides, several

major US cities lay in close proximity to waterways and seaports. Therefore, a well-

organized attack at a major US port is likely to inflict high number of casualties and

cause grave nationwide economic damage.

Estimates of the economic impact of a major terrorist attack at a US seaport vary.

Earlier studies predicted that a port closing could cost the economy as high as $1

trillion [27]. A more recent study by Gordon et al. [18] puts this figure around $45

billion for a dirty bomb attack. For a potential nuclear attack, partially due to higher

level of uncertainty, experts are able to state a wider range for potential consequences.

In a 2003 study [1], direct trade losses were calculated to be around $100-200 billion

whereas property damage is expected to lie between $50 and $500 billion. A more

disturbing figure is the estimated indirect costs to the economy ranging from $300

billion to $1.4 trillion. On the casualty side, the study group judges that the number

should be between 50,000 and 1,000,000.

Port security has been increasingly intertwined with the security of containerized cargo

in the public and the media. While containers are arguably the “Trojan Horses” of the

modern era, failure to recognize other vulnerabilities may leave the US homeland

unguarded for another surprise attack. In this paper, port security is analyzed under four

headings: cargo security, access to secure areas, cruise lines, and security around the

port perimeters. Most of the discussion centers around the cargo security as monitoring

the contents of containers without interrupting the flow of trade poses tremendous

challenges to both public and private stakeholders. However, as will be evident in the

discussion, there are other forms of weaknesses in port security that are equally

important because any attack on the port facility may trigger a slowdown of cargo

processing and inflict casualties.

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3.1.1 Cargo Security

An estimated number of 10 million containers arrive from overseas to the US each year

[5]. With the current level of technology available at US seaports, 5% of these

incoming containers are screened. Containers are the key medium of goods movement

that made the intermodal transportation possible since ’50s. They enable smooth

transfer of cargo between various modes of transportation. Since the introduction of

containers to global supply-chain arena, goods movement has become more efficient.

However, they reduced the transparency of cargo, which present serious challenges to

security of trade in modern era. Concerns over potential shipment of radiological,

nuclear, chemical or biological weapons in containers rose after 9/11 as nations realized

the nature of terrorism threat confronting them.

Companies today are facing the dilemma of simultaneously achieving efficiency and

security in containerized cargo transportation. While some of the security

improvements implemented by the private sector has the potential advantage of

increasing transparency of cargo, incentives to install a wide variety of technologies

that could provide continuous time monitoring and hence minimize the risk of container

tampering are rather limited. Therefore, public stakeholders have to step in to screen

containers at certain points in the supply-chain network to reduce the likelihood that

harmful cargo reaches its final destination in the US. However, with thousands of

containers moving across the globe each day and intense competition that puts

enormous pressure on companies for timely delivery, fully guaranteeing the security of

cargo is virtually impossible. The problem becomes even more complicated as we

realize that not all cargo is containerized and technologies to screen other various forms

of cargo are very limited. Containerized Cargo. US-bound containerized overseas cargo move through

various phases, all of which present unique security challenges. Issues in container

security can be summarized under five phases: loading phase at the warehouse, land

transportation, port of origin, sea transportation and port of destination. Loading Phase at the Warehouse. Terrorists may load illegal weapons and

explosives at the warehouse or distribution center from which the cargo is dispatched.

To achieve this, terrorists may exploit loopholes in physical, personnel and procedural

security of these facilities. Access controls, background checks of employees, security

awareness training, storage of containers, procedures for visitor admission, security of

warehouse perimeters, and standardization of paperwork security should be addressed

properly to reduce the risk of terrorist tampering with containers. Most of these

warehouses are operated by foreign business partners of importers in the US and

located in foreign countries.

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Security of international supply-chains has become one of the priorities of the federal

government after 9/11. To enlist cooperation of private stakeholders, the US federal

government unveiled a new initiative, Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-

TPAT) in November 2001. C-TPAT is a voluntary program of partnership between the

public organizations and private companies to improve supply-chain security.

Participating companies are required to perform self-assessments of their whole supply-

chain and to develop shipping guidelines for their suppliers. The US government seeks

to employ the private sector’s leverage on their global suppliers to address one of the

most vulnerable phases of container shipment: the loading phase. Governmental bodies

in the US have no control on foreign companies to follow proper guidelines in loading

and transporting goods to the US. Companies can use their buying power to have their

downstream suppliers enforce relevant security measures.

Companies that are interested in becoming a C-TPAT member need to prepare and

submit a supply-chain security profile. The profile should include security assessments

of foreign facilities, cargo movement, and background checks of people across the

supply-chain. Currently, C-TPAT members are granted benefits after CBP reviews the

profile information provided by the company, and the history of compliance with laws

and regulations. For importers, benefits may be granted after this review. If CBP is

convinced that the information provided is reliable and the company has a clean

historical record, then the company starts enjoying benefits. Otherwise, CBP performs

an additional examination that includes on-site visits and meetings with the company

representatives. A final decision is made after this review.

Private sector enjoys reduced and expedited inspections under this program as their

cargo are “low-risk.” Companies are also encouraged to use smart containers as their

standard medium of trade. A potential benefit of smart containers is to eliminate routine

inspections. Reduced delays for shipments are vital for companies who are already

operating under tight profit margins. Members are promised to receive priority

treatment from the federal agencies to process their shipments in the case of an attack.

According to a recent study by Peleg-Gillai, Bhat and Sept [29], some participants of C-

TPAT have realized the benefits of membership. The study which was based on inputs

from 11 manufacturers and 3 Logistics Service Providers reports that security

improvements resulted in 38 percent reduction in theft/loss/pilferage and 37 percent

reduction in tampering. In addition to improvements in security, participants noted

related benefits that contribute to business value, such as: 49 percent reduction in cargo

delays, 48 percent reduction in cargo inspections, 29 percent reduction in transit time

and 28 percent reduction in delivery time window. This study clearly demonstrates the

potential of C-TPAT membership in increasing supply-chain visibility, resilience and

customer satisfaction.

Page 12 of 33

However, security improvements under C-TPAT program have been limited in

combating terrorism threat. Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report

[33] in 2005 that discusses the weaknesses in implementation. Their review of the

program shows that the validation phase is not based on an independent audit.

Validation is the last phase in CBP review where selected domestic and foreign sites are

visited. The goal is to ensure that the security profile accurately reflects the level of

countermeasures taken at each site to reduce the terrorism risk exposure. GAO

criticizes CBP for not performing a comprehensive review of the security profile.

Besides, the criteria for selection of sites are not clear. Validations will be most

effective when conducted at critical nodes of the supply-chain with high import volume

and at strategic geographic locations where suspected terrorist activity is of concern.

C-TPAT program can be further improved by standardizing the security

countermeasures across the international supply-chain networks. CBP issues

recommendations under the C-TPAT program. However, these recommendations are

not prescriptive and each member may choose different sets of security solutions to

follow the guidelines. Best practices to secure supply-chains should be determined and

applied uniformly to make sure that relative vulnerability of various supply-chains are

minimal. The system’s exposure to terrorism risk is a function of the vulnerability of the

weakest link when facing an adaptive adversary. Reducing risk of tampering on each

supply-chain to a level at par with what the best practices entail will be a powerful

deterrent to those who have aggressive designs on US seaports. Land Transportation Phase. This phase starts with the dispatch of the

container from the originating warehouse and ends at the port of origin. Cargo theft

during this phase of transportation is a huge problem that the companies need to

confront in the modern era. Cargo insurers in industrialized nations (Italy, Australia,

Germany, and France, with which the US has extensive overseas trade ties) face

enormous claims from cargo theft every year [6]. More recent statistics suggest that

cargo theft is on the rise in Belgium, Netherlands, France, and United Kingdom. 10


particular, high value cargo that include pharmaceuticals, luxury clothing, electronics,

and computer hardware are also high risk.

During this phase, cargo moves in one of the two modes of transportation: truck or rail.

However, due to economies of scale, the mode of transportation may not remain the

same during travel to the port. Cargo may be transferred from one mode to another

(intermodal transfer), or simply within the same mode (intramodal transfer). Security

10 “September Freight Crime Bulletin from EUROWATCH”, www.cargosecurityinternational.com, 10 October 2005. Other reports published by EUROWATCH earlier in 2005 suggest a similar trend in Spain,

Russia, Ireland and Italy.http://www.cargosecurityinternational.com/

Page 13 of 33

breaches at the transfer points and frequent stops in transit may leave cargo vulnerable

to tampering while they are waiting unattended for the next pick-up. However, due to

caps on daily work hours, truck drivers have to make multiple stops for long distance

hauls. Many cargo theft incidents take place by insider help. Therefore, background

checks on the truck and locomotive drivers are vital to transportation security. Other

challenges to cargo security in this phase include source of funding and tremendous

variety of freight hauled on railroads and highways.

Extending US borders beyond the homeland is part of a layered defensive strategy

against terrorism. C-TPAT extends the borders by cooperating with US companies to

use their leverage on their global trade partners. While, C-TPAT helped improve

security at the loading phase of containers, there is relatively little security

improvement in the transportation phase. Supply-chains may not enjoy a high level of

security during the transportation of US-bound containers in foreign countries as the US

government cannot reach beyond American seaports and foreign private companies

may underinvest in transportation security. Those countries with minimal historical

exposure to terrorism may overlook some of the key security issues. Cargo theft is a

serious issue that companies have been countering for years. The most vulnerable

points for cargo theft are the intermodal transfer locations. Local governments have to

take the initiative to beef up security at these locations, so that terrorists are deterred

from tampering with cargo in transit.

Anti-tamper seals have been developed to ensure integrity of cargo in transit. Although,

most anti-tamper seals are cheap, they have minimal impact on security. In some cases,

terrorists can easily break the seal, and replace it with an identical copy after tampering

[9]. Electronic seals can flag an intrusion once they are broken. Thieves have already

developed the expertise to open containers without breaking ordinary anti-tamper seals

[34]. Electronic seals are relatively new, but it is still possible to open a container

without tampering with these seals. A dirty bomb can be located in a container by

removing the doors completely without breaking the seal [7]. It is claimed that a Sandia

technician can easily pass an electronic seal barrier in a couple of minutes [8].

Likewise, Global Positioning Systems (GPS) and RFID technologies do not ensure the

integrity of containers. Both provide good surveillance as to determine where the

container is and to improve transparency, but this will not be a deterrent to a

sophisticated terrorist. Placing the bomb by partially removing the contents of the

container, it is possible to avoid detection. The current technology does not allow

detection of items that are not tagged. Unless both technologies are made smarter,

terrorists may tamper with the container unnoticed. Installation of electronic sensors in

containers is another option, but this technology is still under the development phase

and the rate of false alarms is high. CBP seeks to reduce the false positive rate to 1% or

Page 14 of 33

less. A stumbling block to widespread use of technology is the cost. For example, some

companies today are hesitant to replace bar codes which cost next to nothing with RFID

tags that cost less than $1 per tag.

In an effort to promote the development of smart containers that external parties cannot

intrude, Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) is currently administering a program

called Operation Safe Commerce (OSC). The goals of the program are to increase the

transparency of cargo, employ state-of-the-art technology for inspection, prevent cargo

tampering, and reduce theft. While CSI and C-TPAT seek to reach out foreign ports and

loading facilities to standardize the guidelines for securing container shipments, OSC

seeks to set the standards that should be followed during transportation and when the

cargo reaches US seaports. Use of sensors, seals and other cargo tracking and security

technology are encouraged under this program to identify the best technology and

practices that prevents cargo tampering.

This program initially began as a partnership between government bodies and private

sectors to address vulnerabilities in cargo security. OSC consists of three phases. The

first two phases were completed by the end of 2004, and involved security assessment

of the entire supply-chain. In particular, security assessments at Los Angeles & Long

Beach, Seattle & Tacoma and New York & New Jersey ports were completed along

with a detailed analysis of the vulnerabilities of 19 separate supply-chains. The best

technology and best practices identified in the first two phases are currently subject to

further evaluation in the third phase. If the best practices in various supply-chain risk

assessments are set as industry standards, OSC can have a significant impact on layered

defense against terrorism. Port of Origin. After land transportation, cargo reaches the port of origin.

Cargo containers may be stored around the port perimeter before loading on the ship.

Physical security around port perimeters is a concern. In particular, empty containers

may be enticing targets for terrorists planning to plant and ship bombs across the ocean.

Risk of unauthorized access to secure areas in the port and its perimeters with

counterfeit documents or fake ID is another complicating factor in cargo security at

foreign ports. Human element is key to prevent such attempts. Trained port workers

may be able to detect anomalies and respond accordingly. However, in some countries

corruption at customs is a problem.

Security problems may be further compounded by the lack of state-of-the-art inspection

equipment. Due to increased level of competition between seaports, there may not be

enough incentives to inspect outbound cargo. Container Security Initiative (CSI) was

unveiled in 2002 to address this problem. It is an effort to extend US borders to

confront external threats outside the homeland. The main objective is to identify and

Page 15 of 33

pre-screen the containers that pose risks of terrorism at the port of origin. By

implementing this initiative, CBP seeks to reduce the inspections at US ports, thereby

ensuring efficient flow of trade. As of September 2006, 50 operational ports in Europe,

Africa, Asia, and the Americas participate in CSI.

The criteria for expansion to new foreign ports are based on trade volume, location, and

strategic importance. Eligibility of a foreign port into this program requires installation

of non-intrusive inspection (NII) equipment and deployment of trained customs

officials who can perform inspections. US Customs officials visit participating ports

under the initiative to target and pre-screen the containerized cargo. They also visit the

loading facilities to check the security standards. CBP then assembles a CSI team with

members from either CBP or Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). It is

expected that participating foreign ports are willing to share critical information with

the CBP officials to help target high risk cargo. CBP recognizes that advance

information is the key to security operations. In order to address this issue, the “24-

Hour Rule” was initiated. The rule requires the carriers to report their cargo manifests

24 hours before the cargo leaves the port of origin. This provides the time frame for risk

assessment of cargo.

High risk cargo is selected using Automated Targeting System (ATS) and various

intelligence reports. ATS uses cargo manifest information, targeting rules, shipper, and

customer/importer information to assign each container in a risk category (i.e., low,

medium, high). Intelligence reports and research assistance provided by the National

Targeting Center (NTC) are also checked to make the final decision regarding

inspection of a specific container. The containers with a high risk score are to be

inspected. The medium risk containers are subject to further research. Inspections are

performed by local officials, and a CSI team is given the option to monitor inspections.

Should the officials choose to inspect the cargo, a gamma-ray or X-ray shot of the

container is taken using the Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System (VACIS) to perform

visual detection. Inspectors may decide to open the container and conduct physical

inspections in case they detect anomalies. The decision of physical inspection is

technically given by both CBP and local officials. For nuclear content, radiation

detection devices such as radiation portal monitors (RPMs) are used. The inspection

process as described here may slow down the container flow through seaports. In order

to attract foreign seaports into the initiative, both parties agree that CSI port shipments

will be given the priority in processing; in the case of a terrorist attack that halts port

operations. Likewise, US port authorities may choose to limit their operations to CSI

ports in the case of a minor attack. Accordingly, shipments that originate from non-CSI

ports may experience long delays if a terrorist attack triggers full or partial shutdown of

maritime ports.

Page 16 of 33

Is it possible to locate explosives or illegal weapons in a container owned by a “trusted”

shipper originating from a relatively secure CSI port? Stephen Flynn, a senior fellow in

national security studies at the Council of Foreign Relations, describes one such

scenario in his book, “America the Vulnerable”. In short, terrorists can exploit security

gaps during transportation of containers to a CSI port by loading a dirty bomb at a

railroad facility. They may target a container from a “well-established manufacturer” to

reduce the probability that it’s selected for inspection. According to this scenario, the

shipment originates from Rotterdam. The security breach around this particular port has

been confirmed by the recent drug interdiction incident in Australia. Australian customs

officials seized 370,000 ecstasy tablets in a Melbourne freight warehouse in a shipment

originating from Rotterdam. 11

Other CSI ports have been vulnerable to drug trafficking in recent years. In June, 2002,

a shipment of cannabis that originated from the Port of Antwerp was interdicted in

Ireland. 12

On December 12, 2003, an ecstasy shipment from the port of Tilbury was

discovered in Sydney. 13

According to a recent report prepared by the National Criminal

Intelligence Service of the United Kingdom, “…the use of feeder vessels to transport

cocaine from Rotterdam, Antwerp, and Hamburg to container ports in southern and

eastern England is known to take place.” Terrorists have also utilized CSI ports for

small arms smuggling in the recent past. According to Jane’s Intelligence Review, an

arms cache shipped from the port of Hong Kong via Singapore was interdicted in

Bangladesh. 14

Terrorists may exploit vulnerabilities on inland or maritime shipping

routes to transport weapons and explosives to the US.

There are some other challenges to implementation of the CSI program. The success of

this initiative relies on the level of cooperation provided by the foreign port officials.

According to the current procedure, when high risk cargo is identified, the foreign

customs’ officials are responsible for inspection and US officials are entitled to observe

the inspection process. According to recent reports, US officials’ roles in this inspection

process have been relegated to the review of cargo manifests [19]. Some foreign ports

11 91.7 kg of drugs were hidden in plastic pipes inside eight metal German-made barbecues. Source:

“$18 Million Drug Seizure Like a Needle in a Haystack”, AAP General News Wire, 22 April 2005.

12 Drugs were reportedly discovered in a 40 foot container. Source: “Gardai Question Dutch Man

Following Drug Seizure”, www.irishtrucker.com, 22 July 2002.

13 Total value of the shipment was estimated to be around $16 million. Source: “Counterdrug Press

Summary”, Cubic Analysis Center, 17 November 2004.

14 Insurgent groups northeast India are reportedly tied to the shipment. Source: BurmaNet News, 3

March 2005.http://www.irishtrucker.com/

Page 17 of 33

perceive monitoring by US officials as violation of sovereignty. However, observing

the inspection process is an important element of CSI as the US government is unable

to perform background checks for workers at participating ports.

As of September 2004, 65% [16] of the containers originated from CSI ports (which

constitute 43% of all shipments to the US) have been subject to targeting using ATS,

which implies that the remaining 35% were not subject to any risk assessment and

inspections overseas. GAO attributes this to staffing imbalances at the CSI ports. 72%

of the high risk containers were inspected overseas, and the rest were denied inspection

based on a variety of reasons. Of the remaining 28%, 93% were inspected upon arrival

at a US port. The remaining 7% were not subject to any inspection due to a lowered risk

score based on further incoming intelligence, or because the port of destination was

other than a US port. It should be noted that, further cooperation from officials at

participating ports is required as it may be too late to respond to the terrorism threat

when the container reaches a US seaport.

Implementation of ATS has not been problem free either. Human element in

understanding and evaluating risk factors in transportation of various forms of cargo is

vital in raising the effectiveness and reliability of the targeting system. Expertise in

commercial shipping and supply-chain operations gives the ability to point to anomalies

in shipment routes to detect possible intrusion into containers or the loading of illegal

contraband during visits to ports en route. Without providing such training to customs

personnel and understating the human element in successfully targeting containers, risk

scores will have deficiencies. Another weakness of ATS is its reliance on cargo

manifests, and the route information provided by the shippers. There is virtually no way

to verify the accuracy of the route information, including the seaports visited between

the port of origin and the US port as well as the waterways the vessel navigated.

CSI is not the only program seeking to improve capabilities on non-US seaports in

detecting harmful cargo transported to the US. The Megaports Initiative, unveiled in

2003 by the US Department of Energy (DOE), is a program to improve radiological

material and nuclear weapon detection capabilities at non-US ports. It complements

CSI in that cargo is inspected for nuclear and radiological content at the port of origin.

The ultimate goal is to deter illicit nuclear and radiological material trafficking. DOE

officials negotiate with host governments and port officials and finalize an agreement to

install portal monitors at critical seaports. The agreement addresses critical issues like

equipment needs of the port, placement of equipment, and optimal calibration to detect

nuclear and radiological content. A challenge that the DOE faces is personnel training.

When the agreements are finalized, the host government takes control of all the

equipment, but receives support from the DOE for maintenance. As of December 2006,

the Megaports Initiative is operational in six countries.

Page 18 of 33

The sensitivity of the equipment provided to non-US seaports under the Megaports

Initiative is under the control of foreign port officials. Therefore, port officials may

choose to reduce the sensitivity of RPMs at their will if the number of false alarms

hampers the flow of trade. US officials have no control over the equipment after their

calibration and testing is completed. Another factor that could limit the effectiveness of

the equipment is the environmental conditions. RPMs tend to be less effective in cold

and windy climates. It is difficult to measure the effectiveness of radiological and

nuclear content detection equipment installed at foreign imports under the Megaports

Initiative. Other factors that limit the effectiveness of this initiative are its very limited

coverage and slow progress in installations due to operational difficulties [15]. Sea Transportation. In this phase, cargo travels between the port of origin and

the port of destination in the US. It is a critical phase as there is minimal law

enforcement in international waters and the vessel carrying cargo may visit other ports

before arriving at a US port. This leaves the vessel exposed to piracy and stowaway

threat. Lack of security guidelines to combat piracy makes the problem worse. Most

ships arriving at US seaports carry foreign flags and foreign crew. Therefore,

backgrounds of the crew are not verifiable, and there is no way to detect anybody who

committed crimes in foreign countries. As mentioned earlier, security breaches at

seaports visited en route is another loophole that could be exploited. In an effort to

reduce crime in open waters and seaports, international bodies promote the use of

technology that could track vessels, improve port perimeter security and help enforce

law. The US Coast Guard recognizes the severity of the problem and has taken some

steps to reduce terrorism risk in US waters. We will elaborate more on these efforts

later in this paper when general security in US and open waters is discussed. Port of Destination. Containerized cargo arrives at a US port after sea transit.

Based on the risk score assigned by ATS, each container may be subject to inspection.

Of the nearly 10 million containers arriving at US ports each year, an average of 5% are

subject to inspections every day. The capability to detect harmful cargo largely depends

on the effectiveness of non-intrusive inspection (NII) technologies. Devices with NII

technology encompass X-ray and gamma imaging systems, portable and hand-held

radiation detectors, remote monitoring equipment, and portal sensors. The VACIS that

includes mobile VACIS, truck X-ray, mobile truck X-ray, rail VACIS is a system of

devices used to take radiographic snapshots of containers. CBP has deployed nuclear

and radiological equipment as well. Among these devices are Personal Radiation

Detectors (PRDs), Radiation Isotope Identifier Devices (RIIDs) and RPMs.

Current radiation portal monitor technology does not guarantee an acceptable detection

rate. Highly enriched uranium is not necessarily detected by the current technology if

the concealed under sufficiently thick shielding. A study by Wein et al. [36] concluded

Page 19 of 33

that with the current system of equipment, a shielded nuclear weapon can be detected

with a probability less than 0.1. In this sense, radiation portals offer limited detection

capability. Another concern about the technology is the high rate of false positives.

Items such as granite, porcelain toilets, and bananas can set off a radiation alert. High

number of false positives could disrupt the flow of trade at seaports.

DHS plans to deploy the next generation radiation portal monitors, Advanced

Spectroscopic Portals (ASP) by 2009 to improve detection capability at ports of entry.

Detection likelihood of unshielded or lightly shielded radiological and nuclear material

is expected to be higher with ASP. Besides, new portals offer reduction in false

positives. However, these portals have passive detection capability as the current

technology does and thus heavily shielded nuclear material is likely to evade detection

with ASP. Another drawback is the cost. GAO reports that expert estimate for the cost

of ASP ranges between six to eight times the cost of RPMs currently installed at US

seaports [2]. Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) is currently developing the

next generation detection systems, Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography System

(CAARS) that will provide the capability to detect heavily shielded nuclear material.

However, this revolutionary system is yet in its initial stages of development.

There is no effective detection equipment for biological and chemical weapons. There

are many avenues to introduce contagious diseases and infectious bio-agents into the

US. Should the terrorists choose to bring harm to the nation via bioterrorism, containers

will probably be a less preferred medium of transport. However, containers could be

quite instrumental in some forms of chemical attacks. Tons of ammonium nitrate, an

explosive chemical substance used as fertilizers, is shipped in US waterways every year

as bulk cargo. Terrorists may choose to ship a container with ammonium nitrate and

detonate the load at a US port. Such an explosion can inflict high number of casualties.

Terrorists may also consider container explosions that could release poisonous nerve

agents around the port complex and disrupt the port operations. Development of

technology that could detect containers with undeclared hazardous cargo is vital to

reduce chemical threat at US ports.

Another piece of container security paradigm that has been largely overlooked in the

past is export cargo. With the implementation of CSI and the 24-hour rule, inbound

containers with manifest such as “freight of all kind” were no longer allowed at US

ports. However, containers with such descriptions are still allowed for export cargo.

This leaves the system vulnerable to an attack. A container explosion incident at the

Page 20 of 33

Port of Los Angeles in 2004 was a warning sign. 15

An outbound container which

carried hazardous material exploded when it was laid unattended for three days at the

port without any special precautions taken, because the cargo was supposedly “freight

of all kind”. Besides, security of outbound empty containers has loopholes. 40% of

containers present at a West Coast port on a given day are empty. 16

A particular

vulnerability with empty containers is the lack of any protocol or a requirement to lock

them in transit. Thus, it is relatively easy to place a bomb into these containers. Empty

containers may lie unattended at a port facility for days. Gaps in ensuring security of

export cargo and empty containers should be minimized to reduce terrorism at US

ports. General Cargo. General cargo categories include liquid bulk (petroleum), dry

bulk (grain, paper), and iron ore or steel loads which are usually not shipped in

containers. General cargo ships were used historically to smuggle drugs and other

contraband. 17

Cocaine smugglers are known to prefer shipping their cargo disguised in

iron ore or charcoal shipments because of the relatively low probability of detection.

However, general cargo shipments may not provide the same level of convenience in

weapons smuggling as containerized shipments. Weapons may be smuggled in general

cargo ships if the detection probability for weapons smuggling in containers is

relatively high and thus terrorists are deterred from using containers as a medium of


General cargo ships were reportedly used for terrorism and other suspicious activities in

the past. In 2002, Italian officials arrested 15 Pakistani men with false passports and

suspicious documents on a Tonga-registered vessel carrying a cargo of lead. 18


November, 2001, a Cambodia-registered vessel, supposedly carrying a cargo of timber,

was found smuggling cigarettes into Ireland to finance Real IRA operations [30]. In

15 Congressional testimony on maritime security to Committee on House Transportation and Infrastructure by Michael Mitre. Michael Mitre is the port security director of International Longshore and

Warehouse Union (ILWU).

16 Ibid.

17 For instance, Coast Guard found 10,000 pounds of cocaine hidden below iron ore pellets in 1999.

For more info, please see: “Drug Ship Auction in Texas Draws Bidders Worldwide”, Knight Ridder Tribune,

26 May 1999.

18 They were suspected to have links with Al-Qaeda. Source: “Italy arrests 15 Pakistanis suspected of Al-Qaeda links, terror plans”, Agence France Presse English, 12 September 2002.

Page 21 of 33

2002, general cargo vessel, Karine A, loaded with 50 tons of weapons was captured by

Israeli officials. 19

While considerable attention has been warranted on container security, general cargo

has received little interest, at least in the media. All vessels that transport goods to the

US have to report their cargo information 24 hours before they leave the port of origin

and the arrival schedule 96 hours before they arrive at a US port. Those vessels whose

schedules of arrival have not changed more than 6 hours are not required to submit an

update. The arrival schedule is reported filling advanced notice of arrival (ANOA)

documents, which require information about the last 5 ports of entry. If a ship is bound

to visit multiple ports in the US, it has to file a new ANOA for every single port. The

goal is to determine the route of each vessel in order to assign a risk score. Vessels

larger than 300 gross tons file this document with the National Vessel Movement

Center (NVMC).

For vessels that are less than 300 gross tons, an ANOA is not required. However, some

ports may choose to ask for ANOA information. 20

US-flag recreational vessels are

exempt from this requirement. Most commercial vessels that are less than 300 gross

tons are fishing boats. Inspection will be triggered if given the information from ANOA

or other intelligence information, a vessel is believed to engage in an illegal activity.

Without ANOA, the route information for general cargo ships won’t be known. This

creates another pathway to introduce a dirty bomb or illegal contraband into the US.

The risk is particularly high for ships carrying hazardous cargo. Terrorists may have

interest to explode ships carrying hazardous cargo to inflict more damage.

General cargo ships may also be used as weapons to attack coastal targets, or as

indicated above, to detonate a bomb. These scenarios are discussed in later sections on

security of coastal facilities.

3.1.2. Security of Port Area and Perimeters

Seaports are vulnerable to threats that could originate from port perimeters or inside a

port area. Critical infrastructure around seaports and the vast size of the perimeter area

19 Among the weapons were 122mm Katyusha rockets, 107mm rockets, 120mm mortars, Sager and LAW anti-tank rockets, mines, sniper rifles, Kalashnikov assault rifles, bullets, and explosives. See, “Israel Seizes Palestinian Gun-Running Ship”, United Press International, 4 January 2002.

20 For instance, Port of Los Angeles does not require this information, whereas US Coast Guard in

South Florida began to enforce the rule on May 21, 2004. The vessels have to file ANOA with the captain of the port. For details, please see Lucy Chabot Reed, “No ANOA Needed for Pleasure Vessels Coming to

South Florida.”, www.the-triton.com.http://www.the-triton.com/

Page 22 of 33

augment the fears that physical security gaps can be exploited. Realizing that a port

facility is only as secure as its perimeter, there is a need to develop systems that would

deter, detect, document, and deny any unauthorized entry into a port area and its

perimeters. Access to Secure Areas. Human element is critical to ensure security at a port

area. The goal is to deny access to those who are not authorized and have criminal

backgrounds to secure areas around seaports. The USA Patriot Act of 2001 requires

background checks for all those individuals involved in transportation of hazardous

materials in commerce. Ports are among the intermodal sites where tons of hazardous

materials cross. This legislation was customized to the maritime environment by the

Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002. The act requires issuance of

transportation security cards with biometric information and an overall background

check for all workers employed at maritime ports. Otherwise, those with criminal

records or those who have stolen identities can get an access to secure areas at seaports.

In the current system, verification of identity is achieved by checking photo ID, which

does not require any background check or check against national security databases.

Obtaining a driver’s license did not even require a legal status in the US until recently. 21

In the old system, consular cards issued by other countries such as Mexico would be

sufficient to issue a driver’s license. This opened the door to illegal aliens to get jobs in

port areas. TSA is planning to overcome this identity problem by designing a

Transportation Workers Identification Card (TWIC) that will be issued to all the 12

million transportation workers who need unescorted access to secure areas. These cards

will have embedded fingerprint information and be tamper-resistant.

Progress toward the use of TWIC has been rather slow. TSA awarded a $12 million

contract in August, 2004, and launched a prototype TWIC program at four sites in

November, 2004. When TSA initiated the TWIC program in 2002, the plan was to issue

the first cards in August, 2004 [13]. However, serious delays in critical policy decisions

stood as stumbling blocks to progress. Delays were partly attributed to the late decision

on the type of technology to use and the late approval by DHS to conduct prototype test

and data challenges [3]. In order to mitigate risks due to delays, TSA currently requires

transportation workers to carry different identification cards for each facility they

access. However, without full implementation of the TWIC program, access to secure

areas at seaports will remain to be a vulnerable point of the system.

21 President George Bush signed a legislation that standardizes the procedures across all the states.

The legislation became effective on May 11, 2005. Under the current legislation, the driver has to provide a birth certificate, proof of SSN, a photo ID and a document with their name and principal address. Kevin

Murphy, “New Rules Will Make Your Driver’s License Harder to Get”, The Kansas City Star, 20 May 2005.

Page 23 of 33

Each year, approximately 7,500 foreign flagged ships carry the bulk of shipments into

the US, including 175 billion gallons of oil and other fuels. 93% of US trade sails over

non US-owned or non US-flag ships with foreign crew. Before 9/11, foreign crew could

obtain visa without visiting the embassy or consular office in person as the shipment

companies could obtain visas for all crew members by submitting a list of the crew to a

US embassy. This vulnerability was addressed by requiring all foreign members to

acquire their own visas. However, the threat posed by stowaways remains unless port

surveillance capabilities are improved and access to secure areas is granted with state of

the art identification cards. Terrorists may use this route to either sneak through US

borders, or launch an attack in the port area. They may seek cooperation with the

foreign crew with sympathy towards their agenda to board the ship and penetrate

through the port facility when the ship arrives at a port. At the federal level, there does

not seem to be any effort to incentivize US shippers to enlarge their commercial fleet or

to encourage US vessel owners, who operate their ships under foreign flags, to switch

to the American flag system.

Port officials have taken steps to install new technology to improve surveillance

capabilities in the port area. So far, some ports have installed integrated security

management systems that have video surveillance, automated access control, and

perimeter intrusion detection capabilities. 22

These are positive steps to minimize the

risk of unauthorized access to secure areas in a US seaport. Nevertheless, these

technologies also have limitations. As in the case of RPM, most sensor technology

comes with the dilemma of sensitivity adjustment versus false alarm rate. For example,

motion sensors can be adjusted to track a flying bird, wall vibration sensors may react

to any vibrating object, or machinery and ultrasonic sensors may detect any noise in the

ultrasonic range. In order to reduce the time to identify false alarms, cameras may be

installed around sensors. However, lights may change the thermal environment and

affect the operation of sensors. In sum, a layered monitoring approach will reduce the

likelihood of success for an intrusion attempt. Port Perimeters. Port police and the US Coast Guard are responsible for

policing waterways inside and around every port. Many naval vessels, commercial

vessels with hazardous material, nuclear power plants, densely populated areas, and

critical infrastructure such as bridges are located on or near the open waterways. A

discussion on security around coastal targets is provided later in this paper.

22 An example to that is Port of Oakland. “Port of Oakland Selects ADT to Design and Install a $4.75 Million Maritime Security System”, PR Newswire, 07 May 2003. Port of Galveston, Toledo, and Los

Angeles/Long Beach are also among those that installed similar systems.

Page 24 of 33

3.1.3. Cruise Lines

Terrorists hijacked passenger vessels in the past to accomplish political goals. Like

airplane hijacking incidents, they attracted a lot of attention, which helped spread the

political message of terrorist groups. Cruise ships are enticing targets for terrorists, for

multiple reasons. First, terrorists can hijack cruise liners for piracy and looting

purposes, because there is a widespread belief that cruise ship passengers are wealthy.

Second, some cruise ships have around a 5,000 passenger capacity, exposing them to a

single terrorist attack with the potential to claim thousands of lives. Such an attack

would have ripple effects on tourism, aviation, and the entertainment industry. In this

regard, a well organized attack on a cruise liner will fulfill both objectives of terrorists:

economic damage and a high number of casualties. If terrorists aim at killing the

maximum number of people, cruise ships may suffer either seaborne or aerial attacks. It

is less likely that cruise ships will be used as weapons themselves. A hijacking incident

won’t remain a secret for long, and port officials will have enough time to secure the

critical targets on the coast.

After the 1985 hijacking of Italian cruise liner, Achille Lauro, the cruise industry

implemented a wide array of new anti-terrorism measures. Since 1985, there has been

only one cruise ship hijacking incident. In the current era, hijacking of cruise ships in

the US seems less likely, as the cruise liners have adhered to even more strict security

measures since 9/11. Specific measures that are enforced by the US Coast Guard


o Screening of all passenger baggage, carry-on luggage, and ship cargo. Metal

detectors, X-ray machines, human searches, and canine teams are used to do


o Screening of passenger lists against criminal and terrorist watch lists.

o Restricting access to secure areas in the port and on the vessel.

o Maintaining a 100-yard security zone around cruise ships.

o Underwater surveillance at high risk ports.

There is no doubt that these security measures have been effective in reducing terrorism

risk on cruise liners. The degree of vulnerability to a terrorist attack is more a function

of technology failure risk which is and will be present in most security systems. Cruise

lines are a relatively more secure component of the entire US border security system.


Most US energy power plants, critical bridges, and densely populated urban areas lay

close to waterways. For instance, 75% of oil refineries, a great majority of 103 nuclear

reactors, and all LNG terminals in the US are located onshore. Nearly all major cities

Page 25 of 33

are accessible by waterways. Operation of the infrastructure onshore is crucial for the

US economy. A single attack on any of this infrastructure is likely to inflict a

significant number of casualties and bring serious economic damage. Furthermore, they

may be easier to penetrate from the shore, making them attractive targets for terrorists.

The US Coast Guard has a central role in confronting such seaborne threats.

3.2.1. Discussion of the Coast Guard Capabilities

The Coast Guard currently assumes homeland and non-homeland security

responsibilities, such as enforcing security laws around ports, waterways, and

coastlines, interdicting drug and human smugglers, monitoring fishing areas,

responding to pollution, and conducting search and rescue operations. All these

missions are accomplished with a fleet consisting aircraft, cutters, patrol boats, and

special purpose vessels, such as icebreakers. Before 9/11, most Coast Guard operational

hours were dedicated to search and rescue missions, along with three categories of law

enforcement: protecting fisheries, interdicting illegal migrants at sea, and controlling

the flow of drugs. As 9/11 shifted focus on preventing terrorism, Coast Guard resources

were largely allocated on homeland security related activities, while some of the

traditional missions, such as search and rescue, underwent a significant reduction in

operational hours. 23

The Coast Guard was appropriated $1.5 billion between 2002 and 2004 for equipment

replacement and modernization under the Deepwater Acquisition Program (DAP),

which was initiated in 1996. The program seeks to modernize ships and aircraft used in

missions that cannot be carried out by shore-based small boats. The equipment

replacement and modernization phase, under the DAP, began in 2002 as the contract for

acquisition and integration of necessary equipment was awarded to Integrated Coast

Guard Systems. Funds appropriated for DAP are used to upgrade legacy assets, acquire

new vessels and maintain existing equipment [40]. Another modernization program in

progress is Rescue 21, which will replace the equipment used for coastal

communication needed for search and rescue operations. Total Coast Guard funds

requested for fiscal year 2006 amount to $8.1 billion, which constitute 20% of the DHS

budget [39].

According to GAO, the Coast Guard faces challenges in implementing both DAP and

Rescue 21. GAO believes that DAP has not enjoyed a predictable and steady funding

stream which is key to acquisition and integration of new equipment to the system.

23 According to a GAO report in 2004, this reduction amounted to 22%. Other non-homeland security missions with similar reduction in operational hours are law enforcement activities protecting living

marine resources and foreign fish enforcement.

Page 26 of 33

Furthermore, they report that the acquisition program is behind schedule, and pouring

more money into the program will not help get inline with the original schedule [12].

Due to these delays, GAO estimates that the cost projection of the program that was

originally expected to be $15 billion at the end of 20 years has first risen to $17.2

billion and then recently up to $24 billion. The approach adopted by the Coast Guard in

managing this huge acquisition project to hire a single systems integrator led to

concerns about potential lack of competition in later phases of asset procurement that

may eventually lead an uncontrolled stream of acquisition costs. This prediction was

realized in earlier years of the project, as the estimated cost of the project increased up

to 60%. Another reason behind these escalating costs lies in deepwater aircraft and

cutters “failing at an unsustainable rate,” [17] which compelled the Coast Guard to

revise its implementation plan for this acquisition project.

Similar problems have arisen in the Rescue 21 program that hampered search and

rescue operations across US waters. These problems raise concerns about the capability

of the Coast Guard to achieve some of its missions. GAO has also reported that most

missions may also suffer from lack of station readiness due to staffing and training

problems which lead to prolonged periods of work and shortage of experienced

personnel [14]. While the Coast Guard responded to these problems by increasing its

operational efficiency through improved technology, port security assessments, stronger

partnerships, and better information sharing, most of these improvements have

remained rather local and should be spread all over the maritime security spectrum.

The Coast Guard is currently developing the operational requirements for an Automatic

Identification System (AIS). The International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) package

of security measures which extended Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) in 2002 included

installation of AIS technology as a ship related provision. These security measures that

are known as International Ship and Port Facility Security Codes (ISPS) required AIS

to improve monitoring of vessel movement. AIS is a technology that enables tracking

of vessels by coastal stations and other Coast Guard vessels using a portion of the radio

frequency spectrum for communication. Information such as size of the ship, its course

and speed, registration number, and other identifying characteristics of the vessel can be

transmitted to the central Coast Guard location using AIS. This technology is required

on all vessels over 300 gross tons. These larger vessels are currently documented by the

Coast Guard. The Coast Guard is still developing operational requirements of AIS

technology and evaluating these requirements with all the stakeholders involved. AIS is

crucial to identify all high tonnage vessels in US waterways and accordingly will help

the Coast Guard extend waterway coverage. According to the Coast Guard, an

approved AIS equipment price ranges between $3,000 and $9,000 excluding the

installation costs. These price figures for the equipment makes expansion of AIS a

requirement to vessels below 300 tons costly prohibitive, as many vessels below 300

Page 27 of 33

tons are not commercial. AIS will be implemented in 10 critical maritime areas, which

is only a fraction of over 12,000 miles of coastline and 25,000 miles of river and inland

shoreline. 24

These areas are currently monitored by radar based Vehicle Traffic Service

(VTS) systems.

Smaller vessels which will not be required to install AIS technology are registered by

the individual states. Integration of this data into the Coast Guard’s database of vessel

registry is crucial to increase the awareness of all the vessels in the maritime domain.

The Coast Guard faced problems in the past to integrate state vessel registry data [11].

As of now, there is no legal requirement for individual states to share their vessel

registry data with the Coast Guard. These legal boundaries may reduce the capability of

the Coast Guard to monitor small vessels that may be involved in illicit arms and

contraband traffic.

3.2.2. Vulnerabilities along US Waterways and Countermeasures for Risk Mitigation

We discuss vulnerabilities along US waterways under three titles: critical coastal

targets, pleasure & fisher boats security, and waterways & underwater security. Critical Coastal Targets. Maritime terrorism has hit US and non-US coastal

infrastructure in the past. Terrorists have a plethora of potential targets for launching

deadly attacks on the US coast. History of maritime terrorism suggests that terrorists

have already exercised a variety of options to execute such attacks. In recent years,

many terrorist organizations have added various means of suicide attacks in their

portfolios. This poses further challenges to those who seek to deter terrorists from

attacking one of the most vulnerable points of the nation. LNG facilities, chemical

plants, urban centers, bridges and nuclear plants are among those critical targets that are

exposed to waterborne terrorism threat.

There are various ways to attack critical coastal targets. Terrorists may acquire new

vessels through piracy or smuggle humans on vessels that are destined to sail near the

target of interest. Piracy is a rising threat across the globe, and terrorists are already

known to use piracy for financing purposes. Having acquired a ship to execute an

attack, terrorists may detonate explosives on the ship at a time or location of their

choice, or ram the ship into the target. It may be difficult to execute an attack hijacking

an LNG ship due to security guidelines followed by the Coast Guard, but vessels with

24 These areas cover 10% of the US ports recognized by the Department of Transportation. Some of

the major US ports are not involved in these 10 maritime areas. See GAO Report, GAO-04-868, “Maritime Security: Partnering Could Reduce Federal Costs and Facilitate Implementation of Automatic Vessel

Identification System”, July 2004.

Page 28 of 33

other forms of hazardous cargo may be vulnerable to hijacking. In particular, ships

carrying bulk shipments of ammonium nitrate are potentially vulnerable. A huge

volume of ammonium nitrate flows through US inland waterways each year. For

example, in 1997 over 400,000 tons of ammonium nitrate was shipped through the

Mississippi river. These shipments pass near urban centers such as New Orleans, St.

Louis, Memphis, and Pittsburgh. In order to monitor and reduce vulnerability against

ammonium nitrate and other hazardous cargo shipments (commonly called certain

dangers cargo or CDC), the Coast Guard acted to introduce new regulations in 2004.

These regulations include mandatory development of security plans at vessels and

facilities handling ammonium nitrate, preparation of vessel maintenance and security

records, training of a facility and vessel security officer, and installation of vessel and

facility security systems. These new regulations increased the transportation cost of

ammonium nitrate.

Inland waterways are vulnerable to attacks that could cripple freight routes and

devastate waterfront cities, power plants, chemical facilities, and other critical and

commercial targets. Some of the measures to address the terrorism threat in inland

waterways include routine anti-terrorism patrols, establishment of maritime security

zones covered by the AIS technology, increased inspections on domestic tankers, and

technology based surveillance around inland ports and critical facilities. The Coast

Guard partnered with the private sector to analyze the consequences of explosions on

inland barges carrying CDC. Since 9/11, inland ports have been closed to non-US flag

vessels. The threat posed by barges and small watercraft is still present despite all the

security improvements made so far. Large segments of inland waterways still do not

have any AIS coverage which increases the difficulty of surveillance [28]. There is an

urgency to expand AIS coverage as soon as possible along inland waterways to reduce

waterborne threat in America’s heartland.

The risk of suicidal attacks on coastal targets from sea shores can be mitigated by

blocking access from the sea. Waterborne security barriers such as chains will prevent

terrorists from either ramming into the facility or exploding bombs in the vicinity.

However, remote sensor technology at maritime ports, power plants, or other coastal

targets is needed to detect these attacks in advance. In particular, sensors that can detect

nuclear content from a distance could be a very valuable addition to the anti-terror

armor. Pleasure and Fisher Boats. As mentioned earlier, tracking of general cargo

vessels less than 300 gross tons is relatively poor as these vessels provide no

information about their route. Since most fisher boats are under the 300 gross tons

requirement, there is no way of gathering intelligence about routes fisher boats take in

fisheries. Another point of concern is that fisher boats permitted to enter the port area,

Page 29 of 33

which could let them launch an attack on critical targets in and around a seaport.

Likewise, other open targets on the coast are vulnerable. A similar threat is posed by

pleasure boats. Without further intelligence that triggers boarding of a specific boat,

there is little chance of intercepting terrorists.

Drug smugglers have been known to introduce illegal drugs on fisher boats for a long

time. As the threat of terrorism intensifies, fisher boats may be a new means to

introduce explosives or weapons in the American homeland. Most marinas in the US

have minimal protection from terrorists. Thus, as long as a fisher boat escapes the Coast

Guard’s notice, success is very likely. According to GAO, resource hours allocated to

drug interdiction has been reduced 44% [38]. Drug interdiction performance did not

reflect this reduction on hours devoted to the mission. The Coast Guard attributes this

to improved efficiency in operations due to new technology. Recent evidence of

increased criminal activity involving drug cartels beyond the southwestern land borders

may suggest that this could be attributed to increased drug traffic. In one senate hearing,

Michael O’Hanlon of Brookings Institution said: 25

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, more than half of the Coast Guard was

devoted to port and waterway security against possible terrorist attacks.

Even today, at least a quarter of Coast Guard assets are devoted to such

missions. Other activities ranging from environmental protection to

patrolling of US economic maritime zones to counterdrug missions have


Reduction of hours devoted to drug interdiction may have negative impacts on weapons

interdiction. An increased rate of random boat inspections may be an effective

deterrence-based solution to the problem. Expansion of initiatives and technology

investments increasing maritime domain awareness to include intelligence gathering on

fisher and pleasure boats would be another effective risk mitigation effort. Waterways and Underwater Security. Most of the discussion which is relevant

to waterways security is already provided in previous sections, as there is a significant

overlap between waterways security and security of coastal targets. What distinguishes

waterways security from the earlier discussion is the threat on commercial traffic

flowing in US waterways. Coordinated suicide and mine attacks on ships carrying

hazardous or other commercial cargo are the most prominent scenarios that target

economic prosperity by disrupting trade. Increased maritime domain awareness that

could help the Coast Guard observe, report, and respond to suspect activities of vessels

25 Senate Governmental Affairs Committee Hearing, 20 March 2003.

Page 30 of 33

will mitigate both risks. Vessels should develop anti-piracy measures to detect any

suspicious activity around and report valuable information that could help early


Terrorists may choose to disrupt the trade by laying mines in a port, or around critical

waterways. If mines hit a ship with hazardous cargo, then the damage can be

compounded. Mines may be laid by vessels or frogmen. This threat raises questions

about underwater security, which has been overlooked in the past. A countermeasure to

this threat would be to equip the Coast Guard vessels with mine sensors. No extra

resource hours would be allocated for this mine search mission as regular patrolling

activities would accomplish the task. The Coast Guard is aware of the problem and

unveiled an integrated anti-swimmer (IAS) system to address this threat [25]. The

system integrates technology with human monitoring. Underwater and sonar cameras

are used for continuous monitoring, whereas swimmers and divers can be used to

thwart underwater bombers. Underwater weapons called “non-lethal interdiction

acoustic impulse” devices were still in testing phase earlier in 2005 [23]. The Coast

Guard plans to use these weapons after a verbal warning using underwater speaker

systems. These countermeasures are to deter frogmen from laying mines around ports,

rather than mine detection and sweeping.

The US Navy has resources for mine sweeping and detection activities, but some of

these resources are currently deployed for overseas operations, and all of the resources

(Coastal Mine Hunters and Mine Countermeasures Ships) available domestically are

based in Texas. This increases vulnerability to a mine attack at certain locations in the

US waterways, as it may be difficult to deploy minesweepers on time. In particular, any

West Coast port is particularly vulnerable as it may take a month for a minesweeper to

cross the Panama Canal and arrive at the port under attack. It is mandatory to have

highly trained divers at, or sufficiently close to, critical locations who can clear mines

upon an attack.

4. Conclusion

Terrorism is a multi-dimensional risk that will probably never be eliminated with

limited resources as long as there are those willing to deliver harm. Therefore, the goal

is to achieve maximum possible risk reduction by spending dollars to minimize

weaknesses in security at certain points of vulnerability. DHS has adopted a risk-based

fund allocation principle to address the problem, but more than five years after the 9/11

attacks, US borders remain vulnerable to terrorism threat. Maritime borders are

particularly vulnerable due to the sheer size of waterways that need to be protected and

plethora of targets that terrorists can attack. DHS employs a layered approach to seal

maritime borders against terrorist plots and has introduced several initiatives to this

Page 31 of 33

end. While these initiatives and other DHS efforts have helped defend the American

homeland against this persisting threat, they still leave gaps in maritime security which

could be exploited by an adaptive adversary.

This paper is an attempt to summarize the status of homeland security in the maritime

domain. More dollars will be spent and more resources will be mobilized in the future

for better defense. Expected benefits of every dollar spent to mitigate terrorism risk

should be measured after a comprehensive analysis on the status of security in the

maritime domain. Different elements of maritime security have complex

interdependencies that determine the marginal value of new countermeasures and

initiatives. For example, new technology to improve container security may yield

limited benefits if other avenues to deliver a dirty bomb are left open. Therefore, a

systems-based risk analysis should be used to evaluate the benefits of new technologies,

policies and initiatives.

Intelligence is key to deploying resources to the right locations. Intelligence will help

make correct predictions about the possible terrorist behavior, hence develop strategies

to protect maritime borders. It will also help gauge the degree of terrorist sophistication

and elicit relative probability of various types of attacks. Terrorists may not have the

immediate capability to launch all different types of attacks, so intelligence will help

characterize threats and also monitor terrorists’ agendas. Besides, early interdiction

rests on intelligence and a multi-layered defense that engages all stakeholders in

maritime domain in security. Early interdiction is a powerful way to minimize

economic damage, and in most cases eliminate human losses. It may be too late to

respond if a dirty bomb or a weapon of mass destruction arrives at a US seaport.

5. References

1. ABT Associates, (2003) The Economic Impact of Nuclear Terrorist Attacks on Freight Transport

Systems in an Age of Seaport Vulnerability, executive summary available on the web at


2. Aloise, G. (2006) Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Challenges Facing US Efforts to Deploy Radiation Detection Equipment in Other Countries and in the United States, GAO Testimony, GAO-06-558T,

28 March 2006.

3. Berrick, C. A. (2005) Transportation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize

Resources, GAO Testimony, GAO-05-357T, 15 February 2005.

4. Burnett, J. (2002) Dangerous Waters: Modern Piracy and Terror on the High Seas, New York: Penguin Group.

5. Cohen, S. S. (2006) Boom Boxes: Containers and Terrorism”, Protecting the Nation’s Seaports:

Balancing Security and Cost, edited by Jon D. Haveman and Howard J. Shatz.

6. Coppack, L. (1993) Hijackings Haunt Cargo Underwriters, International Union of Marine

Insurance Convention Report.http://www.abtassociates.com/reports/es-economic_impact_of_nuclear_terrorist_attacks.pdf

Page 32 of 33

7. Durstenfeld, B., Fuhr, P., Haag, W. R., Hsi, P., Ng, J. (2003) Cargo Container Security,

Occupational Health & Safety, August 2003.

8. Edmonson, R. G. (2005) Still Trying on E-seals, Journal of Commerce, 16 May 2005.

9. Flynn, S. (2004) America the Vulnerable, New York: Harper Collins.

10. Fritelli, J. F. (2005) Port and Maritime Security: Background and Issues for Congress, CRS Report to Congress, 27 May 2005.

11. GAO Report, GAO-02-477. (2002) Coast Guard: Vessel Identification System Development

Needs to be Assessed, 24 May 2002.

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Update Needed, 14 June 2004.

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Challenges and Management Concerns Remain, 31 January 2005.

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Progress in Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign Seaports, 31 March 2005.

16. GAO Report, GAO-05-557. (2005) Container Security: A Flexible Staffing Model and Minimum Equipment Requirements Would Improve Overseas Targeting and Inspection Efforts, April 2005.

17. GAO Report, GAO-05-757. (2005) Coast Guard: Progress Being Made on Addressing Deepwater

Legacy Asset Condition Issues and Program Management, but Acquisition Challenges Remain, 22 July 2005.

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on Terminal Island at the Twin Pots of Los Angeles and Long Beach, Protecting the Nation’s Seaports: Balancing Security and Cost, edited by Jon D. Haveman and Howard J. Shatz.

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Quarterly, 17 May 2005.

20. Klaidman, D. and Hosenball, M. (2003) Terrorism: Ties to a Qaeda Chief, Newsweek, 18 August 2003.

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22. Lavery, B. (2001) Irish Police Find 8 People Dead and 5 Sick in Cargo Container, New York

Times, 9 December 2001.

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24. Luft, G. and Korin, A. (2004) Terrorism Goes to Sea, Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec 2004.

25. (No author) (2005) USCG Unveils ‘anti-swimmer’ System to Thwart Underwater Terror Attacks,

Emergency Preparedness News, 22 March 2005.

26. O’Brien, D. (2001) Container Stowaway Raises New Fears Terrorist Suspect Tried to Cross Ocean in Steel Cargo Box, The Virginian Pilot, 26 October 2001.

Page 33 of 33

27. Orszag, P. R., Daalder, I. V., Destler, I. M., Gunter, D. L., Litan, R. E., Steinberg, J. B., O’Hanlon,

M. E. (2002) Protecting the American Homeland: A Preliminary Analysis, The Brookings Institution.

28. Pappalardo, J. (2005) Federal Agencies Tackle Maritime Security, Ports First, National Defense, June 2005.

29. Peleg-Gillai, B., Bhat, G. and Sept, L. (2006) Innovators in Supply Chain Security, The

Manufacturing Institute.

30. Richardson. M. (2002) Raid at Sea Highlights Flag Abuses: Cambodia-listed Ship was Carrying

Cocaine, International Herald Tribune, 24 June 2002.

31. Schneider, D. L., Steiner, R., Romaine, J. (2003) Human Cargo: Health Conditions of Chinese migrants interdicted offshore by US authorities, Journal of Community Health, February 2003.

32. Slater, E. (2005) Human Smuggling Operation Probed, Los Angeles Times, 17 January 2005.

33. Stana, R. M. (2005) Homeland Security: Key Cargo Security Programs Can Be Improved, GAO

Testimony, GAO-05-466T, 26 May 2005.

34. Tirschwell, P. (2003) No Simple Solutions for Box Security, Journal of Commerce, 30 October


35. Valencia, M. J. (2003) Conflation of Piracy and Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Rectitude and Utility, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 01 August 2003.

36. Wein, L. M., Wilkins, A. H., Baveja, M. and Flynn, S. E., (2004) Preventing the Importation of

Illicit Nuclear Materials in Shipping Containers, Unpublished manuscript.

37. Willis, H. H., Morral, A. R., Kelly, T. K. and Melby, J.J. (2005) Estimating Terrorism Risk,

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2005 and Beyond, GAO Testimony, GAO-04-636T, 7 April 2004.

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  • CREATE Research Archive
    • 2007
  • A Brief Analysis of Threats and Vulnerabilities in the Maritime Domain
    • Niyazi Onur Bakir
      • Recommended Citation

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